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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4724
The authors employ the recently completed “poverty 
map” for Morocco, referring to the year 2004, as a tool 
for an ex-ante evaluation of the distributional incidence 
of geographic targeting of public resources. They simulate 
the impact on poverty of transferring an exogenously 
given budget to geographically defined sub-groups of 
the population according to their relative poverty status. 
In both rural and urban areas, the findings reveal large 
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gains from targeting smaller administrative units, such 
as communes or districts. However, these gains are still 
far from the poverty reduction that would be possible 
had the planners had access to information on household 
level income or consumption. The results indicate that a 
useful way forward might be to combine fine geographic 
targeting using a poverty map with within-community 
targeting mechanisms.   
Simulating the Impact of Geographic Targeting on Poverty 
Alleviation in Morocco: 
 What Are the Gains from Disaggregation? 
 























Key Words: Targeting, Poverty, Poverty Maps. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C15, I32, H53.
                                                 
1 Douidich and Ezrzrari are at the Observatoire sur les Conditions de Vie, Haut Commisariat au Plan, Morocco, and Lanjouw is at the World 
Bank    We are very grateful to Ruslan Yemtsov detailed comments and suggestions.  These are the views of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Government of Morocco, the World Bank or any affiliated organization. Address for correspondence: 
planjouw@worldbank.org. 
  
I.  Introduction 
 
  Public policies in developing countries are often articulated in terms of poverty 
reduction objectives.  In Morocco, a long-standing approach has been to provide assistance in 
the form of social transfers, food subsidies, and public investments.  Recent years have seen a 
growing appreciation that a significant fraction of such public expenditures has gone 
disproportionately to the non-poor segments of society.  For example, calculations by the 
Moroccan Planning Commission (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, HCP) indicate that the top 
quintile in the consumption distribution has received more than 40% of total food subsidies and 
more than half of the government’s subsidies to secondary and tertiary education.   
  In 2005 the Government of Morocco launched the “Initiative Nationale Pour Le 
Développement Humain (INDH)” (National Initiative for Human Development).  This broad 
strategy for combating poverty in Morocco aims explicitly to correct for social distortions 
brought about by mis-targeting of public resources.  To this end there has been considerable 
attention paid to the scope for, and potential benefits from, targeting of poor communities. 
However, despite their intuitive appeal, transfer schemes targeting poor communities are 
difficult to design.  Data on incomes or consumption expenditures tend to derive from sample 
surveys that are not large enough in size to permit estimates of poverty at a highly 
disaggregated level.  Absent detailed information on local-level poverty, policymakers have 
often sought to use proxies.  When such proxy indicators are used for targeting rather than 
direct estimates of poverty, mis-targeting can result due to problems with the proxy welfare 
index at the community level.
2 
                                                 
2 For further discussion of the latter problem see Hentschel, Lanjouw, Lanjouw and Poggi (2000). 
  2  In recent years there has been growing experience with the development of “poverty 
maps” that combine household survey with population census data, so as to impute income or 
consumption to each household in the census.
3  The resulting household-level estimates can 
then be aggregated into welfare indices at different levels of geographic aggregation, and have 
been found to yield fairly reliable estimates of welfare at the local level.  In an attempt to 
inform the design of policies under the INDH, the HCP developed a poverty map based on 
census data from 2004 and household survey data from 2002, applying a methodology 
developed by Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2003) under the auspices of the World Bank.  
Such a poverty map can be used to assess the potential gains in targeting efficiency from 
geographic targeting. 
  This paper asks how much the high degree of spatial disaggregation offered by the 
Moroccan poverty map can help to improve targeting schemes aimed at reducing poverty in the 
country.  The paper builds on the earlier analysis in Ravallion (1993) who finds that spatial 
disaggregation to the broad regional level in Indonesia – the lowest level at which household 
survey data provide reliable estimates of poverty – improves targeting, but only to a modest 
extent.  Similarly, in a companion study to the present one, Elbers, Fujii, Lanjouw, Özler, and 
Yin (2007) find that fine geographic targeting offers significant benefits over broad targeting in 
Ecuador, Madagascar and Cambodia..  As in Ravallion (1993) and Elbers et al (2007), we 
consider here the distribution of a hypothetical budget to the population of Morocco.  We 
assume that we have no information about the poverty status of this population other than the 
geographic location of residence and the level of poverty in each location.  As a benchmark 
case we make the extreme assumption of no knowledge whatsoever about the spatial 
distribution of poverty – in which case our given budget is distributed uniformly to the entire 
                                                 
3 See Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2002, 2003) and Demombynes, Elbers, Lanjouw, Lanjouw, Mistiaen and Ozler (2002). 
  3population.  We set up a series of comparisons to this benchmark, where we assume knowledge 
about poverty levels in progressively smaller sub-populations.  For a given level of 
disaggregation, we ask how knowledge about poverty outcomes across localities can be 
incorporated into the design of a transfer scheme so as to improve the overall targeting 
performance relative to the benchmark case.   
  We consider two transfer schemes that make use of this knowledge in different ways.  
The schemes span the range between the simplest, most intuitive transfer scheme to one where 
expected poverty at the national level is minimized subject to information and budget 
constraints.  We compare performance across schemes, and also consider their relative 
performance at alternative levels of disaggregation.  We focus on the squared poverty gap – a 
measure of poverty that is particularly sensitive to the distance between a poor person’s income 
level and the poverty line.
4  We specify a poverty line that accords with a poverty rate of 
around 20% nationally, and we postulate a modest hypothetical budget that would be 
insufficient, in and of itself, to eliminate all poverty, even when perfectly targeted.
5  Finally, 
we ask how close “optimal geographic targeting” in combination with a poverty map, comes to 
the hypothetical scenario of “perfect targeting”.  From this we can get a sense of the potential 
benefit from combining detailed geographic targeting with additional targeting mechanisms 
such as means-testing or self-selection targeting mechanisms within communities.   
  We find that there are potentially large gains in targeting performance from 
disaggregating to the local level.  The benefits become increasingly evident as one makes use 
                                                 
4 We focus on the squared poverty gap because of its appealing properties from both a conceptual and technical point of view.  The 
basic approach explored here would also work for other poverty measures, particularly FGT measures with values of parameter α 
greater than 1.  However, with the headcount measure (the FGT measure with α=0) welfare ‘optimization’ is not well defined and the 
approach taken here is thus less obviously applicable (see for example Ray, 1998, pg 254-255). 
5 We have tried more poverty lines and budget sizes, but for reasons of brevity do not present them in this paper.  In a  companion 
paper, Elbers, Fujii, Lanjouw, Ozler and Yin  (2004) we provide results for a wider set of poverty lines and budgets.  For a formal 
discussion of using “program dominance curves” to assess the poverty impact of different programs, see Duclos, Makdissi, and 
Wodon (2003). 
  4of more and more disaggregated data on poverty. We show that a given impact on poverty can 
be achieved at considerably less expense with detailed spatial targeting than with a uniform 
transfer.  The gains are generally more muted when the targeting scheme makes only crude use 
of the local level poverty estimates.  However, we find that overall targeting performance with 
fine geographic targeting, remains far from the ideal of perfect targeting.  This implies that 
there may be scope for combining geographic targeting with other targeting methods in order 
to reduce errors of inclusion and exclusion even further.  
In the next section we briefly summarize the methodology and data underpinning the 
poverty map estimates in Morocco.  We emphasize that these spatially disaggregated data are 
estimates, with confidence bounds, rather than actual measures of poverty.  Section III 
describes the different targeting schemes that are assessed in the simulation stage, and 
characterizes how one such scheme can be designated as optimal in the sense of ensuring the 
maximum possible gains from geographic targeting.  Section IV describes the simulation 
procedures and presents results, and Section V discusses budget allocations across provinces. 
Section VI provides a concluding discussion. 
 
 
II.  Producing Local Estimates of Poverty 
 
  We employ a methodology for producing local-level estimates of poverty that has been 
described in detail in Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2002, 2003).
6  Let W be a welfare 
indicator based on the distribution of a household level variable of interest, yh.  Using a 
detailed household survey sample, we estimate the joint distribution of yh  and observed 
correlates xh.  By restricting the explanatory variables to those that also occur at the household 
                                                 
6 Elbers, Lanjouw and Leite (2008) present evidence for Minas Gerais, Brazil, in support of the underlying assumptions of the 
methodology.  
  5level in the population census, parameter estimates from this “first stage” model can be used to 
generate the distribution of yh for any target population in the census conditional on its 
observed characteristics and, in turn, the conditional distribution of W.   Elbers et al (2002, 
2003) study the precision of the resulting estimates of W and demonstrate that prediction errors 
will fall (or at least not rise) with the number of households in the target population, and will 
also be affected by the properties of the first stage models, in particular the precision of 
parameter estimates.  A general rule of thumb is that welfare estimates obtained on this basis 
will be estimated fairly precisely as long as the target population comprises at least 1,000-
5,000 households.
 7 
  The first-stage estimation is carried out using household survey data.
8    The empirical 
models of household consumption allow for an intra-cluster correlation in the disturbances (see 
Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2002, 2003 for more details).  Failing to take account of spatial 
correlation in the disturbances would result in underestimated standard errors in the final 
poverty estimates. Different models are estimated for each region and the specifications 
include census mean variables and other aggregate level variables in order to capture latent 
cluster-level effects.  All regressions are estimated with household weights and with 
parsimonious specifications to be cautious about overfitting.  Heteroskedasticity is also 
modeled in the household-specific part of the residual.  
Simulation methods are applied to predict per-capita expenditure at the level of each 
household in the population census.  Since predicted household-level per capita consumption in 
                                                 
7 The relationship between precision of the poverty map estimates and the size of the community is influenced to a large extent by the 
explanatory power of the ‘first stage’ regression models that underpins the idiosyncratic error associated with the poverty estimates.  
Experience in a variety of countries has shown that when R
2’s are around 0.6 or higher, that component of the overall error that varies 
with size of target population is effectively negligible when dealing with communities of 1000 households or more.  With lower 
explanatory power the minimum size of the target population in the census needs to be larger (see Elbers et al, 2002, 2003). 
8 These surveys are stratified at the region or state level, as well as for rural and urban areas.  Within each region there are further 
levels of stratification, and also clustering.  At the final level, a small number of households (a cluster) are randomly selected from a 
census enumeration area. 
  6the census is a function not only of the parameter estimates from the first stage consumption 
models estimated in the survey, but also of the precision of these estimates and of those 
parameters describing the disturbance terms in the consumption models, we do not produce 
just one predicted consumption level per household in the census.  Rather, r predicted 
expenditures are simulated for each household (we carry out 100 replications).  For each 
respective  r, parameter estimates are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution that 
respects the variance-covariance matrices estimated in the survey-based consumption and 
heteroskedasticity regressions.  In addition, disturbance terms at the cluster and household 
level are drawn from their respective (parametric or semi-parametric) distributions.  These 
draws are then applied to the census-level regressors and per-capita consumption is predicted.  
For the next r, a new set of parameters and disturbances are drawn and a new per-capita 
consumption measure is predicted.  The resulting database of r predicted expenditures for 
every single household in the population census is the key database underpinning “poverty 
maps” and the policy-simulation exercise explored here.
9  The data used in this study consist of 
the pairing of the 2002 household survey with the 2004 population census.   
 
III.  Transfer Schemes 
 
As described in Section I, our main objective in this paper is to see to what extent the 
availability of poverty estimates for different geographic locations can help to improve the 
poverty impact of distributing a given budget.  We postulate that the government has a budget, 
S, available for distribution and wishes to transfer this budget in such a way as to reduce 
poverty.  We specify a baseline case in which the government is assumed to have no 
                                                 
9 The poverty map estimate of poverty in community, province or region c is produced from this database in the following manner:  
for every replication r, poverty is estimated over all households in c (after weighting by household size).  The average of all poverty 
  7knowledge of who the poor are or where they are located.  It is therefore unable to distribute its 
budget in any manner other than a lump-sum transfer to the entire population of size N.  We 
thus calculate the impact of transferring S/N to the entire population. 
10    
  The analysis in this paper is modeled closely on the approach laid out in Elbers, Fujii, 
Lanjouw, Özler and Yin (2007), in which the gains from geographic targeting at different 
levels of geographic disaggregation are assessed in Ecuador, Madagascar and Cambodia.   
Optimal use of geographically disaggregated information on poverty has been further 
investigated by Kanbur (1987), Ravallion and Chao (1988), Glewwe (1991), Ravallion (1993), 
and Baker & Grosh (1994). Kanbur (1987) formalized the theoretical problem of policy design 
under imperfect information, while Ravallion & Chao (1988) demonstrated how this general 
targeting problem can be solved in a computationally feasible way.
11  Kanbur (1987) shows 
that to minimize poverty summarized by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty 
measures with parameter value α>1, the group with the higher FGT(α-1) should be targeted on 
the margin.
12  Hence, to minimize the squared poverty gap (equal to a poverty measure from 
the FGT class with α=2), target populations should be ranked by the poverty gap (FGT with 
α=1) and lump-sum transfers made until the poverty gap of the poorest locality becomes equal 
                                                                                                                                                          
estimates, over the r replications, yields the estimated poverty rate in community c, and the standard deviation yields the associated 
estimated standard error. 
10 It could be argued that our benchmark scenario is not terribly realistic.  Perhaps more likely would be a situation where absence of 
detailed information on the extent and distribution of poverty, and absent any specific effort to target the poor, would result in a 
default situation of resources being distributed in a way that mirrored pre-existing inequality.  To the extent that this is true our 
estimates of the gains from targeting, once we assume some information on the distribution of poverty, might be seen as conservative 
estimates of the true benefits. 
11 As we use predicted expenditures from census data unlike Ravallion and Chao (1988), who use observed income data from 
household surveys, we utilize a different algorithm to solve the optimization problem.  Applying their algorithm to our setting would 
yield the same results. 
12 Following  Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) the FGT class of poverty measures take the following form: 
∑     
∑
− =
α α )) / ( 1 ( )
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where xi is per capita expenditure for those individuals with weight wi who are below the poverty line and zero for those above, z is 
the poverty line and   is total population size.  α takes a value of 0 for  the Headcount Index, 1 for  the Poverty Gap and 2 for 
the Squared Poverty Gap.  For further discussion, see Ravallion (1994). 
  8to that in the next poorest one, and so on, until the budget is exhausted.
13  Note that although 
our analysis is undertaken on the basis of the FGT(2) poverty measure, a similar approach 
could also have used some more conventional measure of social welfare; one that does allow 
incomes above the poverty line to also receive some positive social weight.  We have found 
that the broad conclusions from our analysis are not affected by such a change in set-up. 
The second targeting scheme that we compare against our benchmark case assumes 
some knowledge of the spatial distribution of poverty, but does not make use of this knowledge 
in any particularly scientific or systematic way.  This “naïve” targeting scheme was selected in 
order to contrast with the “optimal” scheme described above.  Implementation of an “optimal” 
scheme might be difficult in practice.  Governments often need to be able to communicate in a 
very clear and simple way how resources will be targeted, and this may preclude the fine-
tuning needed for an optimal scheme.  Our naïve scheme attempts to assess how detailed 
geographic targeting improves efficiency conditional on the types of constraints that 
governments may typically face in practice.  
Of course, countless alternative “naïve” schemes could be implemented.  We explore 
here one, particularly straightforward, example.  Experimentation with alternative schemes has 
not yielded any that is obviously more effective.
14  Indeed, the specific scheme implemented 
here has the virtue of not only being simple but also surprisingly effective at times.
  
Our “naïve” scheme takes the following form.  We first rank geographic areas by 
estimated poverty.  If our interest was to gauge the impact of our scheme on the headcount rate, 
we would rank areas by the headcount.  But as we wish, in this paper, to assess the impact on 
the squared poverty gap we rank by those estimates.  We have an assessment of overall poverty 
                                                 
13 Elbers et al (2004) provide a formal statement of this result.    
14 See Elbers et al (2004) for more detail. 
  9in the country.  We take our budget S and divide it by the total number of poor persons in the 
country, Np.  Our budget divided by the total number of poor persons yields the transfer a that 
will be distributed to each person.  We select the poorest geographic area and transfer a to all 
persons in that area.  If the budget has not been exhausted in the first region, we move to the 
next poorest region and transfer a to all persons in this second region.  We continue until the 
budget is exhausted.  In the marginal region - that in which the budget is exhausted - we do not 
transfer a, but transfer an equal share of whatever remains in the budget to the population of 
that last region.  Note that this scheme does not guarantee some amount of transfer to all 
regions.  The scheme also implies that households will be receiving differing amounts 
according to their overall size.
 15 
 
Budget and Poverty Lines 
 
  As has been mentioned in Section I, we assume that the budget available for 
distribution has been exogenously set.  As is intuitively clear, the potential benefits from 
targeting will vary with the overall size of budget.  In the limit, as the budget goes to infinity, 
there is no need for targeting, as even a uniform transfer will eliminate poverty.  In this study 
we employ a number of different budget levels in order to assess the performance of 
geographic targeting mechanisms under different financial scenarios.  As a benchmark, we 
identify the per capita consumption value of the 25
th percentile of the consumption 
distribution.
16  We scale this consumption value by the total population.  Our benchmark 
                                                 
15  We experimented also with a “constrained” optimal scheme that combined simplicity with a limited degree of optimization.  In this 
secheme, a uniform benefit is offered in all areas that the scheme operates in , and no benefits are provided elsewhere.  The optimal 
list of areas is then solved for, conditional on the benefit being the same everywhere.  This scheme resembles the naïve scheme 
described above, but the benefit size allocated is also optimal, rather than determined arbitrarily.  Unsurprisingly we find that this 
scheme performs a bit better than our naïve scheme, but the improvement is only slight, and it comes at a cost of being somewhat 
more complicated to explain.  We are grateful to a referee for this suggestion. 
16 The consumption distribution is constructed on the basis of the average, across r replications, of household-level predicted per-
capita consumption in the population census. 
  10budget is set to equal 5% of this total value.  We treat rural and urban areas separately and thus 
calculate this budget separately in rural and urban areas, respectively. 
  Gains from targeting also vary with the choice of poverty line.  The higher the poverty 
line, the less need for targeting, as leakage to the non-poor diminishes to zero.  In this study, 
we select as benchmark the official poverty line of 3098 DH in rural areas and 3421 DH in 
urban areas..  This line yields a rural poverty rate of 23% and urban poverty rate of 8% in 
2004.   
 
IV.  Simulation Procedures and Results 
 
Simulating the Impact of Uniform Transfers 
Our policy simulation in the case of uniform transfers is calculated in a very 
straightforward manner.  Budget S is divided by total population N.  The resulting transfer a is 
added to each predicted expenditure in our database, to yield  + a .  For each replication r we 
estimate post-transfer national poverty.  The average across the r replications of the estimated 
post-transfer poverty rates yields our expected poverty rate associated with the benchmark, 
untargeted lump-sum transfer scheme.  This new estimated poverty rate can be compared to the 





  11Simulating the Impact of “Optimal” Geographic Targeting 
Simulating the impact of the “optimal” targeting scheme is a bit more complicated.  
Following Kanbur (1987) we want to equalize the following expression across the poorest 
locations of a country: 
(7)   ,   ∫
+ − − =
z
c c c c y dF a y z a G
0 ) ( ) ( ) (
which is z times the poverty gap in location c , after every person in the location has received a 
transfer ac. Fc(y) is the average of the R simulated expenditure distributions of c. The function 
(x)
+ gives the ‘positive part’ of  its argument, i.e. (x)
+=x, if x is positive, otherwise 0. Transfers 
ac  (which must be nonnegative) add up to a given budget S: 
(8)     , S a N c
c
c = ∑
where Nc is the population size of location c. After transfers there is a group of locations all 
sharing the same (maximum) poverty gap rate in the country. These are the only locations 
receiving transfers.  We describe in the Appendix how this problem is solved given that we are 
working with a database of incomes for every household in the population census. 
  Table 1 presents the basic results from our simulations.  There are a number of 
conclusions to be drawn.  First, the availability of disaggregated data on poverty can help to 
improve on a uniform lump-sum transfer across the entire population.  Targeting transfers to 
poor localities, in accordance with the optimization scheme outlined above, yields lower values 
of the national FGT2 than when the budget is transferred as a uniform lump-sum transfer to the 
entire population.  Second, the more disaggregated the poverty map, the greater the 
improvement over the uniform lump-sum transfer.  Traditionally, household survey data in 
Morocco are generally able, at best, to provide estimates of poverty at the regional level.  The 
simulations here suggest that with estimates of poverty at the province, commune and district 
  12levels, further improvements in terms of impact on the FGT2 with a given budget are 
attainable, and are non-negligible.
17  Third, while the general patterns we observe are similar 
across our different budget and poverty line scenarios, they are not identical.  We see for 
example, that the gains from optimal targeting at the district level in rural areas are most 
striking when an extreme poverty line of 75% of the official poverty line is assumed to hold.  
In this case a given budget can yield a FGT2 measure that is just over one third (34%) of the 
FGT2 that would obtain if the budget had been allocated uniformly across the population.  
Similarly, in urban areas, district level targeting and an extreme poverty line that is 75% of the 
official poverty line yield an FGT2 measure that is less than one-fifth the value of the FGT2 
that would have obtained with a uniform transfer.  As is intuitively clear, the lower the poverty 
line the greater the scope for errors of inclusion with a uniform transfer.  Finally, fourth, even 
though our base-case low budget represents a considerable resource envelope (as evidenced by 
the sizable impact on poverty of even a uniform lump-sum transfer) it is clear that optimal 
targeting at the lowest possible level of disaggregation is far from sufficient to eliminate 
poverty altogether (see further below).
18 
  Table 2 repeats the simulations presented in Table 1 but focuses now on the headcount, 
or FGT0, measure of poverty.  As mentioned above the optimization procedure outlined in 
Kanbur (1987) applies to the squared poverty gap or FGT2 measure.  There is no analogous 
optimization algorithm for the FGT0 measure.  We report in Table 2, however, the resulting 
FGT0 estimates from having applied the procedure to allocate our budget in such a way as to 
minimize the resulting FGT2 measure.  Table 2 reveals that the gains in terms of the FGT0 of 
                                                 
17   In urban areas, the lowest level of government administration is at the commune level.  Urban communes are often very large 
agglomerations.  We apply the census concept of a district in urban areas to explore the potential gains from targeting within 
communes, but note that such districts do not have an obvious analogue in terms of local administration or government. 
18   Elbers et al (2004) assess the statistical precision of comparisons of poverty across scenarios.  The statistical significance of 
poverty differences is ascertained by returning to the optimal transfer simulations and estimating not FGT2 values, but rather the 
  13geographic targeting are far less marked than was observed when the FGT2 measure was our 
reference measure.  In the baseline case, targeting at the district level in rural areas can be 
expected to achieve a nine percentage point further decline of the headcount rate over the 
uniform transfer – with commune level targeting the new FGT0 is 91% the value of the FGT0 
that would have obtained had the budget been allocated uniformly across the rural population.  
In urban areas, the gains are more impressive:  the new FGT0 is 65% of the value from a 
uniform allocation across the urban population.  Again, when a particularly austere poverty line 
is selected (column 3) the gains from geographic targeting over uniform targeting are most 
pronounced. 
 
Calculating “Equivalent Gains” 
 In thinking about the “performance” of the transfer scheme we are interested not only 
in the poverty impact of a specific scheme, but also in how much more “expensive” a given 
poverty reduction would be without, as opposed to with, geographic targeting.  To explore the 
latter we apply a variant on the simulation procedures described above whereby we calculate 
how much smaller the overall budget S could be in order to achieve the same impact on the 
FGT2 measure with optimal targeting as with the untargeted uniform lump-sum transfer.  
  Table 3 demonstrates that in rural Morocco even a poverty map at the regional level 
would have permitted the same reduction in the FGT2 as the uniform transfer at only 76% of 
the cost of the uniform transfer.  With a more detailed rural poverty map that allows for 
disaggregation down to the district level, the same impact could have been achieved at only 
28% of the cost of the uniform transfer.  In urban areas, with district level targeting, the same 
                                                                                                                                                          
difference in the estimated FGT2 based on optimal targeting at the 3
rd administrative level vis-à-vis targeting at the uniform, 1
st and 2
nd 
administrative levels.  In all cases, these differences are strongly significant. 
  14impact as a uniform transfer can be achieved at 23% of the cost (Table 3).  These results 
confirm that not only are there gains from spatial targeting, but they can be of considerable 
magnitude. 
 
Simulating the Impact of “Naïve” Geographic Targeting 
The optimization scheme implemented above is intuitively straightforward.  But it is 
not always easy to describe and explain in non-technical terms exactly how much each 
commune should receive under this scheme.  Given that the design and implementation of 
targeting schemes is often part of a political process, and that there is generally a need to be 
able to explain allocations in a simple and clear manner, it is of some interest to ask whether 
gains from spatially disaggregated geographic targeting are also significant when the poverty 
map is combined with simplistic, non-optimal, transfer schemes.   
To simulate the impact of the “naïve” transfer scheme we start by taking our poverty 
map as the basic statement on the distribution of poverty in Morocco.  On the basis of the 
poverty map we identify the localities that will receive priority in the targeting scheme (we 
consider initially regions, then provinces, then communes, then districts etc.).  We calculate the 
amount a that will be targeted to all persons in the priority regions (budget S divided by the 
total number of poor people in the country, Np). We simulate the targeting scheme in turn for 
each replication r by allocating a to all persons in our priority regions (irrespective of whether, 
in replication r, those regions are particularly poor or not) until the budget is exhausted.  We 
re-calculate the post-transfer national poverty rate in replication r.  The average post-transfer 
national poverty rate across all replications provides our estimate of how poverty will have 
changed as a result of the transfer scheme.  This expected poverty rate can be compared to the 
  15original estimate of national poverty from the poverty map, and to the estimate of the poverty 
associated with an untargeted lump-sum transfer. 
  Table 4 presents results of transferring our given budget on the basis of our naïve 
scheme.  It is striking that the reduction in the FGT2 achievable in rural areas with a naïve 
scheme, applied at the most disaggregated level possible in the poverty map, is fairly sizeable.  
Broadly, the reduction in the rural FGT2 on the basis of this scheme is only a few percentage 
points behind the impact with the optimal scheme.  For example, in the baseline case with 
naïve district level targeting (column 1) the new FGT2 is less than half as much (47%) as it 
was prior to the transfer.  This compares with a new FGT2 of 42% of the original FGT2 
measure if targeting had been carried out optimally.   
  Note, however, that there is no guarantee that a naïve targeting procedure as applied 
here will, indeed, yield such good results.  For example, in urban areas, naïve district level 
targeting leads to a new FGT2 that is 49% of original measure.  This compares with an FGT2 
that was just 19% of the original FGT2 when the optimal targeting scheme had been applied 
(Table 3).  Moreover, in column 3 of Table 4 – referring to the baseline budget in combination 
with a particularly austere poverty line - we can see that naïve targeting at the regional level 
even in rural areas achieves less reduction in overall poverty than is the case with uniform 
targeting (a post-transfer FGT2 of 69% of the original with naïve targeting versus a post-
transfer FGT2 of 61% of the original with uniform targeting).  Again in urban areas this is even 
more clearly seen:  naïve targeting at any geographic level higher than the district always leads 
to a post-transfer FGT2 that is higher than the FGT2 that would obtain with a uniform transfer.  
And when the poverty line is set at 75% of the official line, even district level targeting under 
the naïve scheme is less successful than a uniform transfer.  The intuition for this finding is 
  16straightforward:  in urban areas, overall poverty is low and so the transfer a being offered to all 
persons in the priority regions is large (S/Np).  This is rapidly depletes the available budget 
while benefiting only relatively few poor people (and many non-poor people).  After only a 
few priority regions have been targeted the budget is depleted and poor persons in the other 
regions receive no transfer.  In the contrasting case of the uniform transfer all people in all 
regions receive a (much smaller) transfer.  If the poor are generally located close to the poverty 
line then even a small transfer might suffice for a large number of them to cross the poverty 
line, and in this way more poverty reduction can be achieved with a uniform transfer than via 
our “naïve” scheme.  It is clear that in urban areas, the choice of targeting scheme is far from 
innocuous – with major benefits from applying an optimal targeting scheme, and no gains from 
applying a naive transfer scheme. 
 
V.  Budget Allocations across Provinces 
  Our discussion above, exploring the gains from geographic targeting in a country such 
as Morocco, has been essentially hypothetical.  We have explored what might have been the 
impact on measured poverty from distributing a given budget via cash transfer payments, under 
a variety of transfer rules.  A number of principles have emerged from this analysis, the most 
significant of which is that there are potentially appreciable benefits from fine geographic 
targeting over a uniform transfer.  While these general principles are useful to bear in mind in 
the design of anti-poverty strategies, they do not directly address the specific details of 
Morocco’s poverty reduction efforts and cannot be used to directly assess or evaluate these 
efforts. 
  17  As was stated in the introduction, in May 2005 King Mohammed VI of Morocco 
launched the National Human Development Initiative (INDH) and underscored his desire to 
have this initiative represent a cornerstone of his reign.  This initiative builds on previous 
efforts in Morocco to encourage decentralization and to improve the government’s efforts to 
respond to local needs.  The initiative was allocated an initial resource envelope of the 
equivalent of US$1 billion for the period 2006 to 2010, and these resources are devoted evenly 
to four broad components:  a rural component that targets 403 of the poorest rural communes, 
an urban component targeting 264 of the poorest urban neighborhoods, a component that 
focuses specifically on the reduction of vulnerability, and a cross-cutting component aimed at 
building capacity, information exchange and communication. The rural component aims to 
finance activities that support access to basic services, development of economic and social 
infrastructure and income-generating activities.  The design of the project is explicitly not an income 
transfer scheme, but rather one that aims to galvanize the economic and social environment in the 
poorest rural communities.  The selection of the targeted communes in this rural component was based 
on a number of criteria including their estimated poverty rates – based on the poverty map that was 
developed with the 1994 census and 1998 survey data. 
  It is clear that the analysis in the present study cannot be used directly to assess the design and 
operation of the rural component of the INDH.  There are too many ways in which the stylized anti-
poverty strategy considered in this study differs from the INDH.  However, it may remain of interest to 
examine how a given budget would be distributed across the provinces of Morocco if an optimal 
commune-level targeting of income transfers were to be implemented.  This budget distribution could 
be compared against the provincial distribution of the current INDH program.  While there is no 
presumption that the current INDH provincial distribution should be the same as that of the hypothetical 
anti-poverty scheme examined here, it may be helpful to the authorities if it were observed that there 
  18were marked inconsistencies across the actual INDH provincial distribution and the “optimal” 
distribution. 
  Tables 5 and 6 provide a breakdown of the hypothetical budget considered in this study if 
resources were targeted to the poorest districts (Table 5 for rural areas and Table 6 for urban areas) 
from the 2004 poverty map, and the program was designed to transfer resources uniformly across all 
individuals in a given commune (but with different amounts across communes) in such a way as to 
minimize the national FGT2 for rural areas.  Column 1 of Table 5 reveals that in the case of the baseline 
budget and poverty line the five rural provinces of Erachidia (10.67%), Essaouira (7.8%), Ouarzazate 
(6.6%), Taroudannt (5.2%) and Taza (5.17%) would be allocated a little under two-fifths of the entire 
budget to be transferred, in order to achieve the more than halving of the overall rural FGT2 that could 
be achieved with optimal district-level targeting (see Table 1). The remaining 60% of the budget would 
be distributed broadly across another 45 provinces.  It is interesting to note, however, that in the case 
where the budget available for distribution was only half as much (column 2) these five provinces 
would account for a larger fraction of the budget (42%), and when the budget is set at the baseline level, 
but the poverty line is set at only 75% of the baseline case, these five provinces would account for only 
one-third of the budget to be allocated.  Again, this reveals that while the broad priority to be attached 
to these five provinces seems robust, the specific budget shares that should be devoted to these 
provinces is not invariant to the location of the poverty line and the overall budgetary envelope that is 
available for distribution. 
  In urban areas, optimal district level targeting would less markedly concentrate 
resources in a small subset of provinces (Table 6).  The five provinces of Marrakech-Menara 
(6.9%), Fes Jdid-Dar-Dbibagh (6.3), Kenitra (6.1%), Casablanca (6.0%) and Tanger Assilah 
(5.4%) together account for about 30% of the entire budgetary outlays – nearly 10 percentage 
points less than the five most “deserving” rural provinces.  This general picture also remains 
  19when we consider the scenarios with half the available budget or 75% of the official poverty 
line. 
 
VI.  Discussion 
 
  In this paper we have used a “Poverty Map” produced in Morocco to simulate the 
impact on poverty of transferring an exogenously given budget to geographically defined sub-
groups of the population according to their relative poverty status.  We have asked to what 
extent effectiveness of targeting in reducing poverty improves as we define these sub-groups at 
progressively lower levels of spatial disaggregation. 
  We have found large gains from targeting smaller administrative units, such as 
provinces, communes or districts.  We have shown that the benefits from targeting are 
particularly clearly discerned when expressed in terms of budgetary savings of achieving a 
given rate of poverty reduction.   
  Our assessment of targeting performance has been based on an optimal use of estimates 
from poverty maps.  There might be grounds for concern that the design of transfer schemes 
based on such optimized routines suffers from lack of transparency and would be difficult to 
describe in simple terms.  Governments may consequently not be able to apply such schemes 
in practice.  We have considered, therefore, an alternative transfer scheme, based on a naïve, 
non-optimal use of the poverty map.  We have found that while this naïve scheme does not 
achieve the same success as the optimal targeting scheme, its performance remains surprisingly 
good in rural areas.  On the other hand, we saw that in urban areas, the naïve scheme we 
implemented can perform less effectively than even a uniform lump-sum transfer.  To the 
  20extent that policymakers are concerned about issues of communication and transparency, our 
results suggest that there are conditions under which even simplistic targeting schemes based 
on the poverty map can yield encouraging results.  But simulation analyses of the kind 
presented here would be needed to help assess when, and which, simpler targeting approaches 
might be applicable. 
We emphasize further that the stylized analysis presented in this study cannot be used 
to directly evaluate the existing poverty alleviation efforts of the Moroccan government.  We 
suggest that one possible exercise that might inform policymakers’ current deliberations is to 
compare the hypothetical “optimal” provincial budgetary distribution deriving from the present 
analysis with the actual provincial distribution that is currently in place.  There is no 
presumption that these two should line up exactly.  However, it may well be of interest to 
follow up with further investigation if this exercise reveals glaring inconsistencies.  
There are, however, important caveats that attach to the findings in this paper.  First, we 
assume that the government is willing to accept that households with equal pre-transfer per-
capita consumption levels might enjoy different post-transfer consumption levels. Second, we 
assume in this paper that the budget available for distribution is exogenously determined.  We 
abstract away entirely from the question of how the transfers are to be financed.  Political 
economy considerations could influence options for resource mobilization (see for example, 
Gelbach and Pritchett, 2002).  Third, we do not address the very real possibility that the costs 
of administering a given transfer scheme might increase with the degree of disaggregation.  
Fourth, we do not allow for behavioral responses in the population.   Fifth, we do not address 
the possibility that inequalities in power and influence that prevail in a community influence 
  21how transfers are allocated.  Such factors could result in an overestimation of the impact of the 
targeting scheme on poverty reduction.  
Thus the results in this paper should be viewed as illustrative only.  At all times, the 
gains from targeting should be juxtaposed against the potential costs and political-economy 
considerations, as well as scrutinized against other possible policy objectives.  In practice, a 
combination of geographic targeting between villages and means-tested targeting within 
villages may be the best way forward. Policymakers need to assess such programs on a case-
by-case basis to determine just how far to rely on fine-geographic targeting as the central 
element in their poverty alleviation strategy. 
  To conclude, how useful are poverty maps for the purpose of designing geographically 
targeted poverty alleviation schemes?  Our analysis indicates that, in addition to the factors 
already discussed above, the utility of poverty maps will hinge on two key issues.  First is the 
question of whether the poverty map is able to convincingly distinguish between localities in 
terms of poverty.  This will hinge on the statistical precision of the poverty estimates which in 
turn will be largely driven by the accuracy and explanatory power of the consumption models 
estimated using the household survey data.  In the extreme case where a first stage model has 
no predictive power (an extremely low R
2) the resulting community level estimates of poverty 
from the census will all be approximately the same, and confidence intervals around those 
estimates would be so large as to make it impossible to reject equality of poverty rates across 
all communities.  There would be no gains from geographic targeting over a simple uniform 
transfer of the available budget.   
  The second issue concerns how real welfare is distributed in a country.  Even if 
estimates of poverty at the community level are fairly precise, as they have been found to be in 
  22Morocco, simple geographic targeting of resources to communities may not be particularly 
helpful if variation in living standards within communities is pronounced.  Geographic 
targeting will be most effective if the poverty maps reveal both great variation in poverty 
across communities and low levels of inequality in the poorest communities. 
  We have not pursued in this paper the related question of whether poverty maps could 
be used to target individual households.  We have emphasized that household-level estimates 
of poverty, derived on the basis of our methodology, are very imprecise.  One might thus 
expect that household-level targeting using such estimates would yield expected post-transfer 
poverty rates with very wide confidence intervals, implying considerable risk that the transfer 
policy would not yield the expected outcome.  However, even highly imprecise household 
level poverty estimates can still convey information.  And indeed, preliminary calculations 
with our data suggest that household-level targeting could not only yield significant reductions 
in expected poverty, but that even the confidence bounds around this expectation might not be 
too large.  However, we would submit that in deciding to shift from geographic targeting of 
resources to communities, to the targeting of those resources to individual households, there 
are a whole host of additional issues which come to the fore.  These issues extend well beyond 
statistical considerations.  For example, targeting individual households is likely to have quite a 
different, and generally more pronounced, effect on incentives and household behavior.   
Implementation of a national targeting scheme to individual households may also be much 
more difficult to administer than a community-level approach.  And there are also ethical 
concerns.  After all, an empirical study documenting that a particular health treatment would 
lead, on average, to society-wide improvements in health status does not necessarily provide 
adequate justification for doctors to prescribe that specific treatment to individual patients.  
  23The cost of misdiagnosis at the level of the patient might be prohibitively high.  An assessment 
of the merits of household-level targeting against community level targeting requires a broader 
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  26Appendix 
Simulating the Impact of “Optimal” Geographic Targeting 
 
As described in Elbers et al (2007) and in the text, given our interest to minimize the FGT2, 
optimal geographic targeting implies that after transfers there is a group of locations all sharing 
the same (maximum) poverty gap in the country.  We determine the level of transfers going to 
each location by first solving a different problem.  Following the notation introduced in Section 
III consider the minimum budget S(G)  needed to bring down all locations’ poverty gaps to at 
most the level G/z. This amounts to transferring an amount ac (G) to locations with before-
transfer poverty gaps above G/z, such that  G G a G c c = )) ( ( . Once we know how to compute 
S(G), we simply adjust G until S(G) equals the originally given budget for transfers S. To 
implement this scheme we must solve the following equation for ac: 
(A.1)   .  ∫
+ − − =
z
c c y dF a y z G
0 ) ( ) (
In what follows we drop the location index c for ease of notation. Using integration by parts it 
can be shown that 
(A.2)     ∫ ∫
− + = − − =
a z z
dy y F y dF a y z a G
0 0 . ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
In other words we need to compute the surface under the expenditure distribution between 
expenditure levels y=0 and y=z-t, for values of t up to z. Instead of computing G(t) exactly, we 
use a simple approximation. For this to work we split the interval [0,z] in n equal segments and 
assume that the ‘poverty mapping’ software has generated expected headcounts for poverty 
lines z k/n,  where k=0, …,n. In other words we have a table of F(z k/n). Using the table we 
approximate F(y) by linear interpolation for  y between table values. With the approximated 
expenditure distribution it is easy to solve for transfers as a function of G (see below).  In 
practice we find that n=20 gives sufficiently precise results.
19  
The computational set-up is as follows (note that the numbering we adopt means going 
from z in the direction of 0 rather than the other way around).  Define b0=0, and for k=1,...,n, 
bk as the surface under the (approximated) expenditure distribution between z-kz/n and z-(k-
1)z/n, divided by z: 
(A.3)   () ) / ) 1 ( ( ) / (
2
1
n z k z F n kz z F
n
bk − − + − = . 
Let g0 be the original poverty gap, or in terms of the discussion above, g0=G(0)/z. Fork=1,...n,  
put  
(A.4)   .   k k k b g g − = −1
The  gk are the poverty gaps of the approximated expenditure distribution for successively 
lower poverty lines z-kz/n.  Let ak be the per capita transfer needed to bring down the poverty 
line to z-kz/n: 
(A.5)   .  n kz ak / =
We can now solve for per capita transfers as a function of the intended poverty gap g<g0: 
1.  Find k such that  k .  k g g g < ≤ +1
2.  The per capita transfers resulting in poverty gap g are 
                                                 
19 Other interpolation schemes are possible. For instance, if the poverty gap is given at table values zk/n an even simpler computation 
presents itself. Often the poverty mapping software will give percentiles of the expenditure distribution. These can also be used for 
interpolation,  but the formulas are more cumbersome,  since the percentiles are not equally spaced. 














This scheme can be implemented using standard spreadsheet software. 
 
  28 
Table 1:  Impact on FGT2 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
Optimal Targeting Scheme 
 
 Rural  Areas  2004 
 Baseline  Budget 
Basline Poverty Line 




75% Poverty Line 
 
Original  FGT2  0.02036 0.02036 0.00722 
 % of original 
FGT2 
   
Uniform transfer  71% (100%)  85% (100%)  61% (100%) 
Region Level  65% (92%)  80% (94%)  51% (84%) 
Province Level  58% (82%)  73% (86%)  41% (67%) 
Commune Level  45% (63%)  62% (73%)  26% (43%) 
District Level  42% (59%)  59% (69%)  21% (34%) 
 
 
  Urban Areas 2004 
 Baseline  Budget 
Basline Poverty Line 




75% Poverty Line 
 
Original  FGT2  0.00681 0.00681 0.00226 
 % of original 
FGT2 
   
Uniform transfer  53% (100%)  74% (100%)  38% (100%) 
Region Level  46% (88%)  67% (91%)  31% (80%) 
Province Level  44% (83%)  64% (87%)  29% (75%) 
Commune Level  40% (75%)  60% (81%)  24% (63%) 
District Level  19% (37%)  33% (44%)  7% (19%) 
 
 
  29Table 2:  Impact on FGT0 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
Optimal Targeting Scheme 
 
 Rural  Areas  2004 
 Baseline  Budget 
Basline Poverty Line 




75% Poverty Line 
 
Original FGT2  0.2275  0.2275  0.10491 
 % of original 
FGT2 
   
Uniform transfer  85% (100 %)  93% (100%)  78% (100%) 
Region Level  84% (99%)  92% (99%)  74% (95%) 
Province Level  82% (96%)  91% (98%)  69% (88%) 
Commune Level  78% (92%)  89% (96%)  59% (76%) 
District Level  77% (91%)  88% (95%)  54% (69%) 
 
 
  Urban Areas 2004 
 Baseline  Budget 
Basline Poverty Line 




75% Poverty Line 
 
Original  FGT2  0.0801 0.0801 0.0330 
 % of original 
FGT2 
   
Uniform transfer  72% (100%)  86% (100%)  59% (100%) 
Region Level  68% (94%)  83% (96%)  52% (89%) 
Province Level  66% (92%)  81% (95%)  50% (85%) 
Commune Level  63% (88%)  79% (92%)  46% (78%) 




  30Table 3   Cost of Achieving the Uniform Transfer Impact When Using Optimal Targeting 
Expressed as a Percentage of Uniform Transfer Outlay 
 
  Rural Areas  Urban Areas 
Uniform transfer  100%  100% 
Region Level  76.1%  82.0%. 
Province Level  57.1%  73.4% 
Commune Level  31.4%  64.5% 
District Level  27.7%  23.0% 
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Table 4:  Impact on FGT2 of Targeting at Different Levels of Geographic Disaggregation 
“Naïve” Targeting Scheme 
 
 Rural  Areas  2004 
 Baseline  Budget 
Basline Poverty Line 




75% Poverty Line 
 
Original  FGT2  0.02036 0.02036 0.00722 
 % of original 
FGT2 
   
Uniform  transfer  71% 85% 61% 
Region  Level  68% 81% 69% 
Province  Level  62% 76% 59% 
Commune  Level  51% 69% 44% 
District  Level  47% 66% 39% 
 
  Urban Areas 2004 
 Baseline  Budget 
Basline Poverty Line 




75% Poverty Line 
 
Original  FGT2  0.00681 0.00681 0.00226 
 % of original 
FGT2 
   
Uniform  transfer  53% 74% 38% 
Region  Level  76% 78% 86% 
Province  Level  78% 79% 83% 
Commune  Level  76% 76% 81% 
District  Level  49% 49% 57% 
 
 
  32Table 5:  Provincial Distribution of Budgetary Resources with “Optimal” District-Level 
Targeting. 









75% of Baseline 
Poverty Line 
Region Province 
% of Budget 
Aousserd 0,0021  0,0014  0,0013  Oued Ed-Dahab-
Lagouira  Oued Ed-Dahab  0,0015  0,0000  0,0008 
Boujdour 0,0000  0,0000  0,0000  Laayoune-Boujda-
Sakia El Hamra  Laayoune 0,0000  0,0000  0,0000 
Assa-Zag 0,1048  0,1221  0,0904 
Es-Semara 0,0046  0,0000  0,0081 
Guelmim 0,6691  1,0574  0,5798 
Tan-Tan 0,0502  0,0655  0,0416 
Région 
Tata 0,6663  0,5749  0,6754 
Agadir-Ida ou 
Tanane 0,1476  0,0302  0,2229 
Chtouka Ait Baha  1,5854  1,5109  1,5805 
Inezgane Ail 
Melloul 0,1660  0,0697  0,1653 
Ouarzazate 6,6297  8,1895  5,7310 
Taroudannt 5,1833  4,6297  4,8425 




Zagora 2,0899  1,5645  1,8815 
Kenitra 5,1251  4,1464  5,6199  Gharb-Chrarda-
Béni Hssen  Sidi Kacem  4,2732  3,3046  4,9088 
Benslimane 0,7984  0,6638  1,1586 
Khouribga 1,2524  0,8857  1,6306 
Chaouia-Ouardigha 
Settat 0,8426  0,2151  1,5393 
Al Haouz  0,9319  0,5432  0,8621 
Chichaoua 3,0240  2,9484  2,5675 
El Kelaa des 
Sraghna 4,0929  2,7147  3,5097 




Menara 0,0897  0,0092  0,2284 
Berkane 0,5150  0,4509  0,5748 
Figuig 2,2377  3,8629  1,8640 
Jerada 1,3127  2,0763  0,9614 
Nador 1,6573  1,7560  2,0401 
Oujda-Angad 0,2411  0,0511  0,4220 
Oriental 
Taourirt 2,1741  2,8025  2,1357 
Casablanca -  -  - 
Médiouna 0,0001  0,0000  0,0217 
Mohammadia 0,0085  0,0000  0,0679 
Grand Casablanca 
Nouaceur 0,0094  0,0000  0,0545 
Rabat-Salé- Khemisset 1,1911  0,6946  2,1192 
  33Baseline Budget/ 
Baseline Poverty 
Line 




75% of Baseline 
Poverty Line 
Region Province 
% of Budget 
Rabat -  -  - 
Salé 0,4641  0,2781  0,6625 
Zemmour-Zaer 
Skhirate-Temara 0,0660  0,0174  0,2208 
El Jadida  3,2497  2,3924  2,8270  Doukkala-Abda 
Safi 2,6672  1,2749  2,1604 
Azilal 2,4093  1,9930  1,9503  Tadla-Azilal 
Beni Mellal  0,2347  0,1916  0,1862 
Al Ismailia  1,8856  1,9801  1,9634 
El Hajeb  0,1475  0,0306  0,2787 
Errachidia 10,6089  14,6572  9,8554 
Ifrane 0,0365  0,0098  0,0312 
Meknes-Tafilalet 
Khenifra 4,0114  4,4967  4,1413 
Boulemane 1,9444  1,9704  2,2005 
Fes Jdid-Dar-
Dbibagh 0,0000  0,0000  0,0013 
Sefrou 1,1020  1,4366  1,0563 
Fes-Boulemane 
Zouagha Moualay 
Yacoub 1,3953  1,6551  1,4645 
Al Hoceima  0,5423  0,3089  0,7407 
Taounate 0,6289  0,2132  1,0241 
Taza-Al Hoceima-
Taounate 
Taza 5,1707  5,2289  5,3820 
Chefchaouen 1,6523 0,7983 2,0153 
Fahs-Bni-Makada 1,8232  2,2499  1,7610 
Larache 1,3389  1,0188  1,5781 
Tange Assilah  0,2786  0,1526  0,3366 
Tanger-Tetouane 
Tétouan 1,4382  1,3368  1,5362 
TOTAL  100 %  100 %  100 % 
Note:  The provinces of Casablanca and Rabat do not contain any rural areas. 
  34Table 6:  Provincial Distribution of Budgetary Resources with “Optimal” District-Level 
Targeting. 
















% of Budget 
Aousserd  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  Oued Ed-Dahab-
Lagouira  Oued  Ed-Dahab  0.0628 0.0499 0.0312 
Boujdour  0.1035 0.0063 0.1358  Laayoune-Boujda-
Sakia El Hamra  Laayoune  0.4988 0.5925 0.5032 
Assa-Zag  0.1385 0.0623 0.1636 
Es-Semara  0.2383 0.3263 0.2085 
Guelmim  1.1034 1.1150 1.0998 
Tan-Tan  0.4321 0.2567 0.4874 
 
Guelmim-Es-Semara 
Tata  0.4411 0.4683 0.4241 
Añadir-Ida ou 
Fanane  1.9032 2.2281 1.8562 
Chtouka Ait Baha  0.2059  0.1090  0.2259 
Inezgane Ail 
Melloul  2.2009 1.7281 2.3768 
Ouarzazate 0.8493  0.6565 0.8634 
Taroudannt  1.3122 1.1445 1.3506 




Zagora  0.3690 0.2655 0.3899 
Kenitra  6.1400 8.3391 5.5691  Gharb-Chrarda-Beni-
Hssen  Sidi Kacem  2.0688 2.0639 2.1079 
Benslimane  0.3554 0.2907 0.3840 
Khouribga  2.3024 2.1935 2.3351 
Chaouia-Ouardigha 
Settat  2.0087 1.7074 2.0406 
Al  Haouz  0.6078 0.5754 0.6109 
Chichaoua  0.7756 1.0475 0.6916 
El Kelaa des 
Sraghna  2.7374 3.2991 2.5384 




Menara  6.9347 6.5466 7.0183 
Berkane  1.1301 1.0140 1.1629 
Figuig  0.4755 0.4340 0.4623 
Jerada  0.6734 0.6635 0.6427 
Nador  3.1112 2.9897 3.1753 
Oujda-Angad  2.6137 2.4994 2.6775 
Oriental 
Taourirt  1.8877 2.4671 1.7246 
Casablanca  5.9665 6.1023 6.3198 
Mediouna  0.7966 0.9403 0.7341 
Mohammadia  1.1408 1.3647 1.0618 
Grand Casablanca 
Nouaceur  0.3118 0.3022 0.3016 
Khemisset  1.8439 1.8463 1.8263 
Rabat    1.4966 1.5203 1.5059 
Sale  3.8160 3.5303 3.7849 
Rabat-Sale-Zemmour-
Zaer 
Skhirate-Temara  2.9060 4.0686 2.5357 









75% of Baseline 
Poverty Line 
El  Jadida  2.0346 2.1450 2.0620  Doukkala-Abda 
Safi  2.6404 2.5051 2.6893 
Azilal  0.4346 0.2725 0.4674  Tadla-Azilal 
Beni  Mellal  2.9335 2.3660 3.1029 
Al  Ismailia  3.5821 3.1393 3.6557 
El  Hajeb  0.9420 0.9924 0.9199 
Errachidia  1.2955 1.0270 1.2787 
Ifrane  0.5528 0.4978 0.5734 
Meknes-Tafilalet 
Khenifra  2.7196 2.7002 2.6773 
Boulemane  0.5430 0.5935 0.5032 
Fes Jdid-Dar-
Dbibagh  6.3347 4.7654 6.5880 
Sefrou  0.9824 0.9408 1.0007 
Fes-Boulemane 
Zouagha Moualay 
Yacoub  0.0478 0.0526 0.0413 
Al  Hoceima  0.4493 0.3468 0.4936 
Taounate  0.3270 0.2574 0.3603 
Taza-Al Hoceima-
Taounate 
Taza  1.1600 1.1954 1.1777 
Chefchaouen  0.2410 0.1823 0.2533 
Fahs-Bni-Makada  - - - 
Larache  1.7916 2.0704 1.7474 
Tange  Assilah  5.3503 5.4818 5.3899 
Tanger-Tetouane 
Tetouan  2.2289 2.0663 2.3077 
TOTAL  100% 100% 100% 
 